Donald M. Stromquist and Janel. Stromquis v. Clifford Cockayne, James C. Snow, Et al. v. Milton Yorgason and Arthur L. Monson, Et al. : Supplemental Brief of Respondents by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)
1981
Donald M. Stromquist and Janel. Stromquis v.
Clifford Cockayne, James C. Snow, Et al. v. Milton
Yorgason and Arthur L. Monson, Et al. :
Supplemental Brief of Respondents
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.
BRIAN M. BARNARD; Attorneys for Appellants;WILLIAM THOMAS PETERS; Attorney for
Respndents;
This Supplemental Submission is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah
Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Supplemental Submission, Stromquist v. Salt Lake County, No. 16790 (Utah Supreme Court, 1981).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/2014
STATE OF UTAH 




CLIFFORD COCKAYNE, Salt Lake County 
Assessor, JAMES c. SNOW, Salt Lake 
county Auditor, ARTHUR L. MONSON, 
salt Lake County Treasurer, WILLIAM 
DUNN, Salt Lake County Commissioner, 
WILLIAM HUTCHINSON, Salt Lake County 
commissioner, and PETE KUTULAS, Salt 
Lake County Commissioner, 
Defendants-Respondents. 




MILTON YORGASON, Salt Lake County 
Assesspr, ARTHUR L. MONSON, Salt Lake 
County Treasurer, WILLIAM DUNN, 
Salt Lake County Commissioner, ROBERT 
SALTER, Salt Lake County Commissioner, 
Defendants-Respondents. 
Case No. 16790 
Case No. 16919 
SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
A CONSOLIDATED APPEAL FROM ORDERS OF THE THIRD 
JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND 
DENYING THE PLAINTIFFS' MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
THE HONORABLE CHRISTINE DURHAM AND THE HONORABLE BRYANT 
H. CROFT, JUDGES PRESIDING 
BRIAN M. BARNARD 
Attorney for Appellants 
214 East Fifth South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
THEODORE CANNON 
Salt Lake County Attorney 
BILL THOMAS PETERS 
Special Deputy County Attorney 
Attorneys for Respondents 
220 South 200 East, S~te 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah lr4lfl l_ ED 
FEB 2? 1981 Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
1..1..EN H, TiSSAl..S 
RAIG G. ADAMSON 
II..\.. THOMAS PETERS 
OBERT S. HOWE\..L 
llCHAEI.. z. HAYES 
'081N w. REESE 
TIBBALS, AnAnSON, PETERS & IIOWELL 
LAW OFFICES 
SUITE 400 CHANCELLOR BUILDING 
220 SOUTH SECOND EAST 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111 
(801) 531-7575 
March 2, 1981 
Honorable Richard J. Maughan 
Chief Justice 
Supreme Court 
State Capitol Building, #332 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Re: Stromquist v. Clifford Cockayne, et al, 
Case No. 16790 
Stromquist v. Milton Yorgason, et al., 
Case No. 16919 - Supplemental Brief 
Dear Justice Maughan: 
Pursuant to the Court's Per Curiam Decision filed 
February 9, 1981, I prepared and filed a Supplemental Brief 
on the question of standing as requested by the Court. 
However, in discussing the contents of my brief with Mr. 
Brian Barnard, attorney for the Strornquists, I find that 
I have made a mistake in the Supplemental Brief which has 
been filed with the Court on the 27th day of February, 1981. 
On page 3 of my argument, I quote from the decision of 
Judge croft. That quote comes from Judge Croft's second decision 
in the third Stromquist case rather than the decision of Judge 
Croft in the second Stromquist case. The third Stromquist 
case is not presently before the court but only Stromquist 1 & 2. 
/Stromquist 3 from which the quoted language has been taken was 
decided by the trial Judge but is not on appeal. On page 6, 
sentences 1 & 2, I make reference again to Judge Croft's 
decision. And finally, in my conclusion, I request affirmance 
of the decisions of the lower court and in particular that the 
Court affirm Judge Croft's ruling that the plaintiffs were 
without standing to.bring the action. Again this refers to 
Judge Croft's ruling in the third Stromquist case. 
I would therefore request that the Court review 
my brief on the issue of standing and disregard the above 
identified references to Judge Croft's deicision in the third 
Stromquist case which is not presently before this Court. 
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Honorable Richard J. Maughan 
Page 2 
March 2, 1981 
I would like to apologize for the inconvenience 
this may cause the Court or to my opposing counsel. The 
reference was the result of the fact that I had utilized some 
of the reasoning in Judge Croft's decision in the third Stromquist 
case in my oral argument previously held before the Court and 
had left that decision in my file relative to the cases presently 
pending before the Court and upon receipt of the Court's decision, 
reviewed my file to prepare the Supplemental Brief and inadvertently 
included references to Judge Croft's decision. 
If I can be of any further assistance or if any 
further explanation is required, please do not hesitate to 
contact me. 




cc: Brian M. Barnard 
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STATEMENT OF PURPOSES OF SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF 
This brief is submitted pursuant to the Order of 
the Supreme Court set forth in its Per Curiam Decision filed 
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February 9, 1981 directing the parties to file supplemental 
briefs on the issue of Plaintiff's standing to bring the 
action. 
Pursuant to the Court's directive, this brief is 
supplemental in nature and therefore, Respondents depart 
from the usual format set forth in the Rules of Civil 
Procedure for preparing and filing an appellate brief and 
reference is made to the brief previously filed by the 
Respondents in this case for compliance with the requirement 
that there be a Statement of the Nature of the case, the 
Disposition in the Lower Court, the Relief Sought on appeal, 
and the Statement.of Facts. The further briefing requested 




THE PLAINTIFFS WERE WITHOUT STANDING TO BRING THE 
ACTION AND THE RULING OF THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD 
THEREFORE BE AFFIRMED 
Plaintiffs-Appellants in their Complaints for 
Mandamus and Declaratory Relief for the years 1978 and 1979 
did not allege any direct or indirect injury by the actions· 
complained of. Indeed, there is no such injury. 
-2-
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Plaintiffs-Appellants, in their Complaint, do not allege or 
establish any immediate threat of harm. There is no such 
threat of harm. They do not allege or establish injury to 
any legally protectible interest particular to theme There 
is no interest peculiar to them. 
Further, 
As was stated by Judge Croft, in his decision: 
"No facts are alleged to support this conclusion 
and none of the grounds set forth in Rule 65A{e) 
for injunctive relief are apparent in the pleadings. 
There is no allegation of any injury or damages to 
plaintiffs set forth in the Complaint." 
"Plaintiffs by their Complaint are seeking to com-
pel County officers to comply with statutory provi-
sions with no allegation of facts showing that they 
are not doing so." 
In Main Parking Mall v. Salt Lake City, 531 P.2d 
866 (Utah 1975) this Court set forth the requirements that 
must be met in order to state a cause of action. 
"A party maintaining an action under the Declara-
tory Judgments Act must have a substantial interest 
or a legally protectible interest in the subject 
matter of the litigation. The Complaint fails to 
allege that the plaintiff has a legally protectible 
interest in the contract which is the subject 
matter of the action. It thus appears that the 
plaintiff does not present a justifiable issue for 
determination by the Court." (emphasis supplied) 
-3-
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In this case, there is no justifiable issue for judicial 
determination. Plaintiffs did not allege any direct or 
indirect injury resulting from the actions complained of. 
Plaintiffs did not allege or show any immediate threat of 
harm. They did not allege or assert any injury to any per-
sonal or private legally protected interest that is peculiar 
to them. Indeed, there is no injury. There is no allegation 
of damage that they would suffer. In Baird v. State, 574 
P.2d 713 {Utah 1978) this Court required that a real as 
opposed to an academic controversy must exist. In the 
majority opinion, Justi~e Maughan made the following 
observations: 
"There were no concrete facts pleaded indicating any 
specific injury sustained or threatened to plain-
tiff personally. There were no allegations that 
plaintiff had sustained a particularized injury 
that set him apart from the public generally and 
would give him standing to challenge the constitu-
tionality of the act." 
No such particularized injury has been alleged in any of the 
actions filed by the Stromquists. The questions presented 
by the Stromquists in their several lawsuits, are purely 
abstract and academic. 
"The Courts are not a forum for hearing academic 
contentions or rendering advisory opinions." 
Supra, page 715. 
-4-
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In order for the court to entertain any action for 
declaratory judgment, the following conditions must be met: 
"(l) a justiciable controversy; 
(2) the interests of the parties must be adverse; 
(3) the party seeking such relief must have a 
legally protectible interest in the 
controversy; and 
(4) the issues between the parties involved must 
be ripe for judicial determination." 
A review of the pleadings in the cases presently before the 
Court will clearly demonstrate that the Strornquists have 
failed to allege sufficient facts to satisfy any one of the 
four requirements set forth above. 
The Stromquists in their Complaints, seek to compel 
county officers to comply with statutory provisions but they 
make no allegation of facts in their Complaint to show that 
said officers are not complying. This failure precludes the 
Court from entertaining their Complaint. As was stated by 
Justice Maughan in Baird v. State, 574 P.2d 713, (Utah 1978) 
at page 715: 
"To invoke judicial power to determine the validity 
of executive or legislative action, claimant must 
show that he has sustained or is immediately in 
danger of sustaining a direct inJury as a result of 
that action. It is insufficient to assert a 
general interest he shares in common with all mem-
bers of the public, VIZ., a general grievance. 
-s-
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To grant standing to a litigant, who cannot 
distinguish himself from all citizens, would be a 
significant inroad on the representative form of 
government, and cast the Courts in the role of 
supervising the coordinate branches of government. 
It would convert the judiciary into an open forum 
for the resolution of political and ideological 
disputes about the peformance of government." 
(Emphasis supplied) 
Judge Croft, in his decision in the instant case, refused to 
presume that the county officers would not comply with the 
law. Since the wrong complained of by plaintiffs was not 
shown to be peculiar to them but rather, was public in 
nature, the trial court correctly ruled that plaintiffs had 
no standing before the Court and correctly granted 
defendants' Motion to Dismiss. If the wrong complained of 
is public in character, as is present in this case, plain-
tiff must allege sufficient facts to disclose a special 
injury that affects plaintiff separate and apart from the 
other citizens. This has not been done by the Stromquists. 
They therefore have no standing to urge the unlawfulness of 
the governmental action. "It is not the duty of the Court 
to sit in judgment upon the action of the legislative branch 
of government, except when a litigant claims to be adversely 
affected on a particular ground by a legislative act." 
Baird v. State, page 717. 
-6-
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The general rule, as set forth in Baird v. State, 
has been followed by this Court in the cases of Jenkins v. 
State, 585 P.2d 442 (Utah 1978) and Jenkins v. Finlinson, 
607 P.2d 239 (Utah 1980), and is the law of this State. 
The position adopted by the Utah Supreme Court as 
set forth in the four cases cited above has also been 
followed in other states. 
In Mobile Oil Corporation v. McHenry, 436 P.2d 982 
(Kansas, 1968) a taxpayer was seeking mandamus to compel the 
performance of certain duties. The Supreme Court of Kansas, 
observed as follows: 
"It has been said that Mandamus will not lie 
at the instance of a private citizen to compel 
the performance of a public duty; that such a 
suit must be brought in the name of the State, 
and the County Attorney and the Attorney 
General are the officers authorized to use the 
name of the State in legal proceedings to 
enforce the performance of public duties. 
Where, however, an individual shows an injury 
or interests specific and peculiar to himself, 
and not one that he share with the community 
in general, the remedy of Mandamus and other 
extraordinary remedies are available." 
The Mobile Oil case indicates that a taxpayer has 
no standing to compel performance of a public duty by a 
-7-
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public off ical unless the taxpayer can show that he is uni-
quely hurt by the conduct. He must show an interest speci-
fic and peculiar to himself. 
certainly the taxpayer in the present case cannot 
make such a showing. It is questionable whether or not 
these taxpayers allege any injury at all, let alone one that 
is peculiar to them. 
Supporting the holding in the Mobile Oil case is 
some language found in 36 Am. Jur. 2d, Section 78, Page 661. 
It is stated in this paragraph that: 
"Where a penalty is payable to the State, it 
seems clear that the action therefor should be 
brought in the name of the State, unless some 
other mode is enacted by statute or 
established by custom." 
Certainly the plaintiff can make no such showing in 
this case. There is no provision in the applicable statute 
which would allow the plaintiff to bring this suit. 
In Tabor v. Moore, 503 P.2d 736, (Washington, 
1972), the plaintiff sought to compel city and county law 
enforcement officials to refrain from an alleged practice of 
holding suspects for unreasonable lengths of time. In 
-8-
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denying the taxpayers standing to bring the suit, the 
Supreme Court of Washington held that: 
"In the absence of a special interest in the 
outcome of a suit, a condition precedent to 
maintaining an action against public officials 
for illegal expenditure of funds is that 
demand ·be made upon the Attorney General to 
institute proceedings to preven the illegal 
expenditure of funds." at page 738. 
That case is very similar to the one at hand. The 
taxpayers in the instant case allege in effect that certain 
funds have been expended illegally. These plaintiffs claim 
that the County Assessor has been paid wages in contraven-
tion of statute. In order to make such a claim, however, 
the Supreme Court of Washington stated that the taxpayer 
must first make a demand on the Attorney General to enforce 
the statutory provisions; and, the Washington Supreme Court 
held that without having made such a request, the plaintiff 
has no standing to bring an action for Mandamus to compel 
the Attorney General to enforce the provision~ Indeed, the 
request of the Attorney General was found to be a condition 
precedent to a Mandamus action. 
Here the plaintiffs made no such demand on the 
-9-
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County Attorney or Attorney General. Therefore, as in 
Tabor, this Court should find that the taxpayer has no 
standing and must first make the request before bringing the 
mandamus action. 
In the case of Reiter v. Walgren, 184 P2d 571 
(Washington, 1974), the Court announced the same principle 
of law which was relied on by the Washington Supreme Court 
in Tabor. The language in Reiter seems to go even further, 
however. The Court in Reiter found that the taxpayer who 
had no special interest, and had not made the required 
demand on the County Attorney or Attorney General, had no 
capacity to sue, as well as no standing. 
In the case of Austin v. Campbell, 370 P2d 769 
(Arizona, 1962), the Arizona Supreme Court held that a state 
statute which required such a request on the Attorney 
General before instigating suit was a jurisdictional 
requirement. A Court exceeded its jurisdiction if it con-
sidered a suit brought to compel official action where the 
required request had not been made. 
Finally, in the case of Lyon v. Bateman, 228 P2d 
818 (Utah, 1951), the Utah Supreme Court held that a tax-
-10-
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payer can maintain an action to question an appropriation 
under an unconsitutional statute only when he has shown a 
pecuniary interest. No such interest exists or was alleged 
in the instant case. 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted, that Judge Croft, in 
the second Stromquist case, correctly ruled that the 
plaintiff-appellants were without standing to bring the 
action. His legal conclusions are supported by the deci-
sions of this Court, Courts from other jurisdictions, and 
the decisions of the trial courts should therefo~e be 
affirmed. 
~ 
DATED this 2Z._~day of February, 1981. 
THEODORE L. CANNON 
Salt Lake County Attorney 
0 s 
Special Deputy County Attorney 
Attorney for Defendant-Respondents 
-11-
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the foregoing brief to Plaintiffs-Appellants' attorney, 
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84111 by placing a copy of the same in the u. s. Mail, 
postage prepaid, or by placing a copy of the same with The 
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. -~~~ 
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